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Behavioral neuroscience has presented philosophers with the task of clarifying the
relationship between neural determinism and free will. If neural functions encode
information and govern decision-making, are the constructs of will, agency and indeed
morality illusions of pre-scientific ignorance? This article will argue that neuronal function is
necessary for representing distinct sensory-perceptual, cognitive, motivational, emotional
states, and motor functions. However, neural transmission and action potentials are
simply chemical-physical representations of these informational states but are not
the embodiment of consciousness itself. By some yet undiscovered mechanism,
consciousness “reads” the neuronal events into conscious experience. Absent a
particular specialized brain region or sufficient relevant transmitters and receptors,
relevant information cannot be processed and the individual cannot be conscious
of that informational state. In natural and many artificial communication systems,
communications proceed bi-directionally. By an argument of symmetry, if neuronal activity
can communicate with consciousness, there is no reason to preclude consciousness
from communicating back and influencing neuronal function. In the intervening conscious
moment, information from diverse perceptual, motivational, cognitive, and emotional
sources is weighted and will results. This process then biases resultant neural processes
to actualize the willed target. This approach is limited in terms of operationalization
into an experimental study because at present, there is no method to measure
consciousness-independent of neuronal function and subjective report.
Keywords: will, consciousness, information representations, necessary not sufficient, neural representations of
information
The notion of will has engaged religious thinkers, philosophers,
and secular moralists since ancient times. More recently neu-
roscientists have entered the debate with ongoing advances in
untangling the workings of the brain to explain different aspects
of behavioral outcomes. Implications for moral and legal systems
are profound. With amorality at one end and divine evaluation
of every human deed at the other, free-will is what humans use
to base their accounts and judgments of others. Neuroscientist
Sperry (1976a) discussed two issues, conscious awareness and
free-will almost four decades ago but their parameters remain
unresolved through the intervening period of scientific inquiry
and advancement. It is our position that the two are intertwined
to produce behavior via brain mechanisms that generate subjec-
tive conscious and evaluative experiences that under appropriate
conditions, afford responding to stimuli in ways that we desire.
From our perspective, the ability to will actions appears to rest on
consciousness.
Behaviorists asserted that all meaningful behavior was deter-
mined by stimulus response laws, leaving no room for will.
With the advent of behavioral neuroscience, researchers adduced
considerable evidence that specific behaviors have anatomical
and neurotransmitter/receptor “homes” and have argued that
since information processing follows identified, regular patterns,
behavior is determined by the neural chemical-physiological
mechanisms rendering behavior causally determined by neural
information processing (Sperry, 1976b), essentially precluding
will and moral decision-making. This paper will present what we
perceive as a lacuna in neurobiological accounts of consciousness
and as a consequence, a possible alternative that definitely accepts
that neurobiological processes are a necessary, but insufficient
condition for consciousness. Consciousness in our perspective is
the lynchpin between neurobiology and will.
Neurobiological approaches typically propose neuroanatom-
ical connections deemed necessary for consciousness to occur.
To illustrate, we first provide a non-exhaustive but representa-
tive survey of the neurobiology of consciousness and then present
what we see as problematic with this perspective. We argue that
neurobiology is necessary for consciousness to occur with distinct
neural states serving as representatives of particular informa-
tional states, but why this does not constitute consciousness itself.
We propose an alternative that consciousness is intermediary
between neural representations of informational states and will.
By an argument of symmetry, we suggest that if neurobiology
can communicate with consciousness, there is no intrinsic reason
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to preclude consciousness from communicating with neurobiol-
ogy. It is in the reverse flow of information from consciousness to
neurobiology that will is expressed.
DEFINITIONS
We will define a few central terms to frame the discussion to
follow. Consciousness has a variety of meanings in different
contexts including arousal in the sleep-wakefulness continuum,
self-awareness in the introspective context, qualia in terms of
sensory experiences, and an inclusive general awareness of being
cognizant of place, time, person, and an abstract, symbolic ability
to represent the experiential perceptual, emotional, motivational,
cognitive, and motor states being processed on a moment to
moment basis. This more encompassing but specific conceptu-
alization (i.e., does not directly refer to the sleep-wakefulness
dimension nor does it refer to comatose patients) is related to
attention (Watt and Pincus, 2004).
From an existential perspective, the question of qualia with
respect to conscious experience remains despite the lack of a
compelling explanation for why neurobiological processes pro-
duce rich and holistic experiences (Crick and Koch, 2003). For
example, there is something “it-is-like” to experience a patch of
red, to experience a sensation (i.e., pain), and these phenom-
enally unmistakable and deeply subjective aspects of conscious
experience have been termed qualia (Crick and Koch, 2003).
How we experience the redness of red stems from brain activity
and the difficulty in describing one’s subjective percept of such
experience is still an unresolved issue. A principle goal in sensory-
perceptual research focuses on isolating one-to-one relationships
between neural activities and specific experiences. This approach
has met with considerable success. For example, neurobiological
correlates of the visual perception of shape, size, color, texture,
or movement of an object are reasonably well and fully estab-
lished (Crick and Koch, 2003). However, it might be argued that
activity in the visual modality (and by extension, other sensory
modalities) despite one’s consciousness of them lies beyond will
to significantly change. Research pertaining to sleep-wakefulness
cycles deals with the factors needed for all forms of conscious-
ness in the ascending reticular systems in the brainstem. Here
again, researchers are presented with difficult questions of an
empirical nature. However, they are strictly dependent on the
neuroanatomical functions related to the unconscious state of rest
during sleep. For the purposes of this paper, it is attentional pro-
cesses that are involved in the production of conscious awareness
and the aftermath in free-will that will ultimately set the stage for
new questions on human morality and decision-making.
The five general information processing domains noted above
[perceptual, motivational, emotional, cognitive (including lan-
guage), and motor] contribute to consciousness to greater or
lesser degrees reflecting salience-based attention in varying con-
texts and environments (Gallace and Spence, 2008). Thus, we
will avoid overly particular (i.e., sensory-specific) notions of con-
sciousness. Additionally, this paper is not about what ultimately
constitutes morality and ethics but human ability to consciously
consider the moral or ethical components of a situation and
reference the situational elements against one’s moral or ethi-
cal principles. It is recognized that different societies recognize
different action as moral and immoral (e.g., gay pride parades
are not equivalently regarded in different parts of the world).
Even within specific legal systems, different players may have dif-
ferent and mutually exclusive ethical imperatives where the role
of the practitioner is an accepted discriminant of ethical behav-
ior. For example, mental health professionals performing forensic
assessments are enjoined by professional ethical standards to pro-
vide complete and objective opinions with respect to a variety
of legal issues including criminal responsibility/insanity. Lawyers’
primary ethic is the best interests of their clients and not objective
truth within an adversarial legal system.
A FOCUSED REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Philosophies of mind debates have historically revolved around
consciousness because of its obvious implications for agent
free will, action, and ethical behavior. More recently, this has
paved the way for exploring potentially inviolate relationships
between neurobiological states and behavioral outcomes. The
overarching question relates to whether consciousness of vol-
untary actions is experienced without sufficient neuropsycho-
logical determinative causal conditions or states (i.e., that they
are free; Searle, 2000). Philosophical researchers have aimed to
unravel consciousness by conducting empirical studies. However,
the deductive approach has proved inadequate in addressing the
question of where consciousness is and how it operates. The
general definition that was used to describe consciousness ear-
lier in the field of psychology was “primary” level consciousness
which is “an awareness of one’s surroundings, of the self, and
of one’s thoughts and feelings” (Sommerhoff and MacDorman,
1994). Sommerhoff and MacDorman (1994) distinguish primary
level consciousness from other abstract levels that are derived
from language and propositional knowledge. The distinction in
levels psychologically is theoretical and perhaps arbitrary for
the purpose of anatomical and empirical research when focus-
ing on a type consciousness in the five processing domains
of attention. Turner and Knapp (1995) used Sommerhoff and
MacDorman’s theoretical framework of consciousness to draw
out evidence of primary consciousness in cerebral structures by
inducing electrical stimulation to produce an experience that
is directly apprehended in human subjects. The occipital, pari-
etal and frontal lobes produced experiential responses, while
Broca’s and Wernicke’s speech areas produced speech upon elec-
trical stimulation (Turner and Knapp, 1995). The argument
made by these scholars was that only the structures of the
anterior temporal lobe can afford evoked experiences of con-
sciousness. That is, upon electrical stimulation of the anterior
temporal lobe structures including the temporal cortex, hip-
pocampus and amygdala, realistic visual and auditory experi-
ences were evoked. However, they added that the temporal lobe
does not act independently but rather is part of an anatomical
system of relays with other brain regions (Turner and Knapp,
1995).
More recent efforts attempted to refine these conclusions by
arguing that although anatomically specific brain regions are nec-
essary for the experience of consciousness, they are not sufficient.
For example, Baars and Laureys (2005) specifically propose that
the philosophical effort of Block to include cognitive neuroscience
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lacks grounding due to the limited nature of Block (2005) inter-
pretation of cognitive neuroscience (Baars and Laureys, 2005).
The two types of consciousness that Block (2005) presents are
“phenomenological consciousness” (what we experience) and
“access consciousness” (the information we can access via con-
scious experience) which Baars and Laureys contend are necessary
but not sufficient for conscious qualities. The point made is that
the contents of visual consciousness for example, require the
visual cortex but activity in the visual cortex is not sufficient
for conscious qualities (Baars and Laureys, 2005). Furthermore,
researchers have found no correlation between visual cortices
and consciousness without parietal and prefrontal activation
(Dehaene et al., 2001). Baars and Laureys make it a point to
state that unconscious brain mechanisms are necessary for con-
scious experience but reject Block’s (2005) notion of “access
consciousness” because stimulation within the brain does not
evoke conscious experience, while they remain necessary for the
experience of consciousness itself (Baars and Laureys, 2005).
Searle (2000) raised the question of whether will is a subsumed
feature of neuroanatomy. However, Searle situates his discus-
sion on the consciousness of free action within an account of
anatomical structures of the brain. The notion that conscious-
ness can be reduced to conscious behavior or to functional
states of a system, is replaced by the more commonly accepted
belief that consciousness is indeed a biological phenomenon
which consists of sentience, awareness, thoughts, and feelings
(Searle, 2000). Klemm (2011) sees consciousness more anatom-
ically grounded. His “Conscious System” involves active circuitry
between the brainstem reticulum, basal forebrain, thalamus, and
neocortex with the brainstem ascending reticular arousal system
(ARAS) activating areas of neocortex to generate consciousness
and wakefulness (Klemm, 2011). This position invokes features
of consciousness resulting from activation of specific aspects of
neuroanatomical activation.
More restricted examples of sensory-level analyses of con-
sciousness have been made for the olfactory system Keller (2011).
While arguably necessary for specific sensory experiences, these
focal experiences do not capture the multiplicity of consciousness
in a holistic manner andmay be irrelevant to the direct neurobio-
logical dynamics of will. It is the summation of all those andmore
that produces consciousness and subsequently, will of action is
the translation of “selection of stimuli and choice of response” as
first mentioned by James et al. (1980/1950) and (Ingvar, 1994).
Discussions on the role of attention in consciousness awareness
have been an important part of the empirical research conducted
on consciousness due to the fact that attention can be varied
experimentally which in turn affect conscious awareness (Keller,
2011). Ingvar (1994) argued that conscious awareness is a pre-
requisite for willful acts, since willful acts include active (i.e.,
directed) attentional mechanisms.
As an example of a specific sensory information processing sys-
tem, the neural pathways deemed necessary for visual perception
encompassing consciousness is characterized by complimentary
streams leaving the occipitally located primary visual cortex. The
dorsal stream projects to the parietal lobe, then the frontal lobe,
and then both project to the corpus striatum (McIntosh et al.,
1994). The ventral stream projects to the cortex of the anterior
temporal lobe to the amygdala and hippocampus. The dorsal
stream situates the visual array within three-dimensional space
enabling guided motor behavior (Taylor, 1997). Alternately, the
ventral stream affords the ability to identify, remember, and rec-
ognize the heuristic and emotional significances of objects of
perception (McIntosh et al., 1994). Turner and Knapp (1995) also
note that although the visual modality has perhaps been the most
thoroughly researched, sensory information from other sensory
modalities also relay into complex, meaningful forms that gen-
erate conscious awareness of the stimuli that activate particular
sense organs, activate modality specific pathways and are experi-
enced as distinct properties with unique sensory qualities. Turner
and Knapp (1995) conclude their argument that consciousness is
localized in the temporal lobe by showing that with bilateral ante-
rior temporal lobe leucotomy in humans, there are resultant and
severe deficits in object discrimination, emotional responding
and inability to recognize faces. We note that it is only these infor-
mational specifics that are precluded from consciousness; not
consciousness per se as illustration by retention of consciousness
of other informational states.
Baars and Laureys (2005) contend that one cannot equate pre-
requisites for consciousness with the source of consciousness. An
activated temporal lobe may be required for human conscious
experience of some informational states. However, they them-
selves are not equivalent to conscious experience per se. We take
this as our point of departure from notions of neuroanatomically
situated models for consciousness that appear intrinsic to posi-
tions advanced by Searle (2000), Klemm (2011), Ingvar (1994),
Keller (2011), and Ungerleider and Haxby (1994), although we
clearly endorse the necessary neurobiological activation of dis-
tinct information processing networks for expressing particular
types of sensory/perceptual, cognitive, motivational, emotional,
and motor information.
PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
We propose the following thought experiment to illustrate
our initial difficulty with neuroanatomically embedded mod-
els of consciousness. Let us assume a candidate “Network of
Consciousness (NoC)” that involves a Hebbian circuit with nodes
involving the Brain Stem Reticular System (affording sufficient
arousal), the basal forebrain, thalamus and neocortex similar to
that proposed by Klemm (2011) above. Let us further assume
that one was able to slice 50mm of rat brain in such a fashion
as to dissect out connected neurons from these four anatomical
sites. The 50mm slice was then put onto a Petrie dish filled
with physiological saline solution. Stimulating and recording
electrodes were placed in the first and third neurons within this
circuit and repeated stimulations of the initial neurons caused
numerous circuit volleys of electrical activity clearly measured by
the recording electrode. Despite the requisite neuronal conditions
being met for consciousness, it would be a stretch to consider
consciousness existing in the Petrie dish. First, the neuronal
events consist of potassium, calcium, and chloride ions traversing
the semi-permeable axonal membranes and neurotransmitter
molecules navigating the synaptic cleft, docking in appropriate
receptor molecules, and releasing to await the next cycle. It is the
frequency with which this cycle repeats that conveys particular
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informational codes that one can be conscious of. These fre-
quency codes represent specific informational states within
modality specific and non-specific (association) tracts in the
brain. One could arrange an array of peanuts, raisins and feathers
on two sides of a leather strap to convey particular informational
states. Two peanuts, one raisin, and three feathers to the left
could represent horse, two peanuts, one raisin, and three feathers
to the right of the strap could represent a cow and two peanuts,
two raisins, and three feathers to the left could represent a camel,
and so on. The informational code is not consciousness per se but
some informational representation is necessary to be conscious
of. Unlike the famous Seinfeld episode, one cannot be conscious
of nothing.1 Consequently, the brain has two complimentary
meta-strategies for representing information. The first is the
frequency code alluded to above. The second is the place code.
Identical frequency trains for example, in visual and auditory
cortices give rise to experientially distinct sensations. Another
problem with “locating” consciousness within a particular
biological object involves where in that object does consciousness
arise? Considering the three basic neuronal components how
might one attempt to localize or “bits of consciousness” or
fractionate consciousness itself within the post-synaptic, axonal,
or pre-synaptic regions?
A second major but less “localizable” aspect of consciousness
is its integrating function. To use the visual example, distinct
networks within the visual system represent and process five
individual parameters of visual experience; shape, size, color, tex-
ture, and state of motion. The majority of mankind fortunately
possesses intact brains and consciously experiences shape, size,
color, texture, and motion of an object as an integrated whole;
not as a mosaic of these different parameters linked together.
Somehow we experience visual scenes and the objects within
them as unified visual objects with all five characteristics seam-
lessly integrated. It is hard to explain how anatomically separated
tracts cooperatively fuse different elements into a unified whole
when other interacting networks that may be turned on and off
simultaneously retain distinct sensory qualities. However, absent
information representation within a specific tract, the individ-
ual cannot become conscious of the information that would have
been represented there. At a very gross level, someone with a sev-
ered optic nerve cannot be conscious of the information that is
no longer represented through that eye. More subtly, the non-
intuitive phenomenon of “blind-sight” occurs when the ventral
tract is disrupted, resulting in people reporting not seeing objects
presented in their visual fields while producing occipital evoked
potentials. Although identification is impossible, they paradox-
ically demonstrate the ability to catch or avoid objects thrown
at them because they can still “see” the motion through their
unimpaired dorsal visual stream while not reporting conscious
identification of the moving object.
We proposed that “consciousness” requires intact neural infor-
mation processing to exist but neural processing per se is not
1For our purposes, we see information in its most general sense as a reduc-
tion in uncertainty. Consequently, absent information, any possibility or
possible relationship is equally probable. Determinism results from 1 to 1
correspondences resulting in no subsequent degrees of freedom.
consciousness. We observe that in a sense, science is a bi-
directional process with definitions and deducible explanations
resulting from this “downward” (reductionist) process (e.g.,
Newton’s Second Law: F = MA; A = ˆS/ˆT; S = ˆD/ˆT with
M, D, and T being fundamental and measureable qualities of
the Newtonian world). Non-deducible phenomena resulting from
complexity (i.e., interactions of large numbers of elements within
a system) are commonly accounted for by the term “emergent
properties.” There are two forms of “emergent properties.” The
first occurs when a basic understanding exists for why the non-
deducible property emerges. For example, reactions in inorganic
chemistry involve electron sharing in outer shells with consis-
tent and predictable regularities. Organic chemistry is replete
with unpredictable reactions that need to be memorized due to
the inapplicability of electron sharing rules. This is explained by
the extensive length of organic molecules (i.e., carbon chains)
that fold over on themselves and block available electron sites
from reacting with each other. We will refer to this as a “strong
emergent property” because we understand why this complexity
necessitates the vitiation of simpler regularities. “Weak emergent
properties” occur when an inexplicable phenomenon occurs from
complexity without any sense of why. Since we have shown why
we argue that consciousness is not ostensibly reducible to neu-
ronal functioning, the notion of it being an “emergent property”
of neuronal complexity is essentially a meaningless phrase nam-
ing the issue requiring an explanation rather than a helpful expla-
nation. What then is the relationship between neurobiological
function and consciousness?
We propose that consciousness entails a “reader” of neural
events. We do not pretend that we know what form or location
or type of energy is produced through reading neural events.
What we do “know” is that consciousness is a different dimen-
sion from the myriad and intricate but knowable biochemical
process that are necessary to generate consciousness. To illus-
trate, should a pin goes through the skin of our left thumb, we
do not get a digital message that a sharp, hard object has bro-
ken our skin and activated nociceptors at location x, y, z, but,
we experience OUCH and we know where! Somehow, conscious-
ness integrates the different parameters into a single, coherent,
integrated experience.
CONSCIOUSNESS ANDWILL
To this point we have argued that neurobiological processes
function as representing conveying and processing informational
states. These processes necessarily exist if we are to be conscious
of the specific information they potentially convey. We will now
argue that the concept of will can be introduced into this sys-
tem. Will can result if we accept that natural communication
systems are bi-directional. For example, if Mr. Songbird can chirp
his desires to Mrs. Songbird, Mrs. Songbird can chirp back her
shopping list. Similarly, if neurobiology can communicate in
a feed-forward fashion with consciousness, by an argument of
symmetry, there is no a priori reason to exclude consciousness
from communicating back to neurobiology. Indeed, the prin-
ciple behind neurofeedback is that one can use their “will” to
alter quantitative EEG (QEEG) patterns that have been shown
to be associated with some form of psychopathology or another.
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Passively watching brain wave patterns does not result in desired
changes. Neurofeedback however has been shown to be successful
in a number of areas subsequent to altering brain wave pat-
terns. Neurofeedback (and likely biofeedback in general) would
appear at least on the surface to provide empirical evidence that
thoughts and desire (will) can change neuronal patterns in the
retro-example of neuronal patterns being expressed as behaviors.
LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
We make no claims to having an understanding of the “emer-
gence” of consciousness from neuronal activity. We will resist the
tendency for some to say that X is an “emergent property” of
Y as if the phenomenon has been “explained.” Most frequently,
“Emergent Property” is pulled from the hat when the individ-
ual has no clue as to how the property emerges. We make no
such claims. We acknowledge than many of our neuroscience col-
leagues will criticize this work on the basis that in a sense, it is
“unscientific” because it proposes an intrinsic limit to what scien-
tists might 1 day comprehend. After all, if we do not know where
to look or what form of energy consciousness takes, how can we
build a “consciousness detector”-independent of the electrical or
magnetic currents generated by or secondary to axonal transmis-
sion or chemical trails of synaptic processes? Our major goal has
been to convey that although well-defined neural substrates pro-
vide informational representations necessary for consciousness,
they do not embody consciousness. Rather, in some currently
unidentified fashion, consciousness is a “reader” of neural infor-
mational states that produces consciousness. Will then become
possible as the “reverse-engineered” information processing, run-
ning from the conscious to the neural. While not presenting a
working mechanism for consciousness and will, we do produce
a way of thinking about will that respects the integrity of the
levels of organization, does not engage in descriptive circularity,
and specifies paths for future thinking. We do not apologize for
raising the possibility that there indeed may be limits to what
we as humans might ultimately comprehend. However, we wel-
come those in opposition to address the conceptual issues that
we raise.
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